Greg Detre
Thursday 1 February, 2001
Lucy Allais, History of Philosophy III
To be is to be perceived. What exactly does Berkeley mean
by this? Assess his reasons for believing it. Assess Berkeley�s objections to
matter.
[6] For an example of contemporary anti-realism, see: Hilary Putnam. "Why There Isn't A Ready-Made World," In: Reality in Focus, P.K. Moser (Ed.), pp. 34-49, 1983. A lot of current anti-realist and idealist positions are motivated by results from quantum physics. For an excellent introduction, see: N. Herbert. Quantum Reality. Anchor Press/Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1985.
idealism vs phenomenalism (Dancy)
idealist: objects are collections of actual ideas, objects only exist as long as they are actually being perceived (by someone)
phenomenalism: the objects are actual and possible ideas, objects exist as long as someone could be perceiving them
you could read Berkeley as a phenomenalist for the most part, but he�s trying to be a true idealist
the difference between the two (real vs imaginary) becomes unimportant in a theistic world, doesn�t it???
to be is to be perceived � what about hallucinations???
not a real �steady, coherent, vivid perception� � does this work??? (Cartesian/Humean)
does it work as a proof of God�s existence???
premises:
so some spirit must be producing them
so why can�t there be > 1 spirit??? why must he be good? why are ideas inactive???
how do our + God�s perceptions dovetail???
is God�s perception of things the same as ours???
God causes them � we can only cause imaginary ones???
is there an objective world???
can ideas be shared??? what if we both see the idea???
does God perceive/will???
objects are collections of ideas � we each see a different one???
sounds almost perspectival
what does this collection consist of???
are Berkeley�s metaphysics vs ontology different???
steady coherent vivid (Berkeley) vs force + liveliness (Hume) vs clear + distinct (Descartes)
why does he reject relational properties???
he�s convincing, within his metaphysics � internally consistent
so what are his big assumptions???
we can�t hold PQs without SQs � so they�re all SQs
is it a RTP???
do ideas resemble our perceptions of them???
NO � there�s no cause of the ideas � there is just the ideas
he�s just substituting God for the real objects
trying to appeal to common sense, leaving God as assurance of coherence
all the objects = ideas
no space in the physical space
so what about touch and apparent distance?
space as distance through time in touch-experiences
what about movement/momentum, e.g. skateboard, appear to travel distance without undergoing touch-experiences
why is there a sense of time (and space)???
need causal laws to be upholded in his world of ideas � requires no more faith than the faith we have in causal regularity in the physical world
how scientific is his world of ideas???
he doesn�t believe in causation, though there are regularities (Humean)
time as a measure of change
what about error???
how could there be error???
is our perception of the ideas limited?
you only get it wrong when you imagine/don�t use your will carefully enough (Cartesian)
can we make mistakes if we directly apprehend the ideas??? does it have to be an RTP???
do we perceive with our intellect or senses???
why do we have a sense of self???
our souls as drops in the Brahman ocean of God???
why do we have a sense of bodies and internal senses???
monist � spirits vs ideas??? immaterial dualist
mind-body problem in the immaterial world
different to: materialist who believes only in the world of appearances
Berkeley's
immaterialism is open to "gross misinterpretation," as he said in his
preface; rightly understood, it is common sense
his original line of argument for immaterialism, based on the subjectivity of colour, taste, and the other sensible qualities, was replaced by a simple, profound analysis of the meaning of "to be" or "to exist." "To be," said of the object, means to be perceived; "to be," said of the subject, means to perceive.
when
a person imagines trees or books "and no body by to perceive them,"
he is failing to appreciate the whole situation: he is "omitting" the
perceiver, for imagined trees or books are necessarily imagined as perceivable.
The situation for him is a two-term relation of perceiver and perceived; there
is no third term; there is no "idea of " the object, coming between
perceiver and perceived.
he
accepted and built on "two heads," "two kinds entirely distinct
and heterogeneous": (1) active mind or spirit, perceiving, thinking, and
willing; and (2) passive objects of mind, viz., sensible ideas (sense-data) or
imaginable ideas.
Idealism seems in accord with Locke's ideas of secondary qualities, which he says do not exist in the objects themselves (i.e., they are merely subjective). So Parmenides and his modern-day equivalents, beginning with Berkeley, are essentially eliminating Locke's notion of primary qualities.
"You
may hold, if you will, that objects of sense have only an 'in-and-out'
existence, that they are created and annihilated with every turn of man's
attention; but do not father those views on me. I do not hold them."
In his notebook he wrote, "Existence is percipi or percipere. The horse is in the stable, the Books are in the study as before."
Berkeley follows Descartes in a number of ways
Berkeley�s idealism boils down to a strong materialist theism with a less plausible name and suffers from all the usual problems
it�s got a weird dualism, both immaterial, with the idea-spirit/mind-body problem
both hinge on God � the rest is defensible
world of ideas as an indistinguishable linguistic parallel to the world of ideas
how does Berkeley fit in with my thesis that all metaphysics is a footnote to philosophy of mind???
what does Berkeley say about hallucinations???
isn�t this a bit like the brains in a vat???
are we assuming that God verifies the causal regularities???
what�s the difference between materialist and immaterialist monisms???
what about the internal senses???
how scientific is the world of ideas???
how different is this to a materialist who believes only in the world of appearances???
what�s Hylas� twisted definition of matter (2nd D)???
how does Berkeley�s later argument differ from his early views/approach in the Dialogues???
how does Philonous change his tune when Hylas rejects the man/mite extension argument on the basis of an idea of absolute extension???
is it something to do with universals only existing as instantiated in the particular�???
so our senses are relative + subjective
does that serve to prove Berkeley�s point???
we all disbelieve the senses. how � immaterialism???
spreading + substraction???
arg for permanence � consensus � meta-perspective
regularities indicate/best described by a systematic relation between ideas in our minds and a constructed substrate that they represent
what about the internal senses???
even without the main 5, iw ould still have proprioception, hunger etc.
Berkeley page numbers
175 para 2 \ without sensible qualities, there�s nothing sensible???